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The Influence of European
Colonialism on Zande Customary
Law
Laws are the moral foundations of
social order. They are established to govern the
way in which individuals act within a society in
an attempt to impose stability, conformity and
acquiescence. Because a specific set of laws
functions only within the bound system in
which it is established, the effectiveness of the
legal system is contingent upon the general
acceptance of those rules by that pmticular
society. Law, like any other culturally
constructed institution. must therefore be
understood in reference to the society in which
it is developed.
If a common understanding among all
community members is fundamental to the
successful implementation of the legal code.
then an interesting dilemma arises when
examining the application of European law in
tribal societies. If colonial powers were to
impose European law on tribal society what
effect, if any, would it have on indigenous
people? Without conmmnity solidarity and an
understanding of the legal code, it is unlikely
that any individual would embrace such laws.
Such is the case with the Azande. Here the
principles of different systems of law created
conflict. when one system of law was
supelimposed on another. The result was a
system of "legal pluralism" where the chiefs.
who, prior to colonization. presided over all
legal procedures, were forced to simultaneously
abide by their customary laws as well as employ
the legal sanctions of the colonial powers
(Reyntjens 1992: III). In many cases. the legal
power of the chief was revoked by the colonial
power and transfened to European
administrators who had little understanding of
jlllisprudence within Azande culture (Reining
I966:xvii). If the customary law on which the
Azande based their daily practices was distorted
by European intervention, then there could be
little faith in its prescribed justice. As a result.
Azande chiefs lost much of their po\\·er. the
customary laws of the Azande were
compromised and the Azande people turned to
vengeance magic as a means of settling legal
disputes.
Traditionally, the authOlity of the chief
was never questioned in matters of law (Evans-
Plitchard 1962:213). The chiefs held courts in
which they exercised a great deal of power, and
their judgements served as detenents to future
injustices. Numerous accounts list death or
mutilation among the traditional punishments
rendered upon the guilty pmty (Reining 1966: IS).
Known among the Azande for his particular
harshness was the chief Gbudwe. Evans-
Plitchard, dllling his time spent in Zandeland,
noted many accounts of Gbudwe's character and
the convictions by which he IUled. Evans-
Plitchard, in his retelling of such accounts,
described Gbudwe as "stem" and "morose,"
taking harsh action against "disloyal people,
sorcerers, witches, adulterers, and those who
flouted custom or good manners" (Evans-
Pritchard 1962:217).
Such accounts of brutality are not
uncommon. Schweinfurth relates that "for the
purpose of exhibiting their power over life and
death [the chiefs] will occasionally feign fits of
passion. and that. singling out a victim from the
crowd, they will throw a rope about his neck, and
with their own hands cut his throat" (Evans-
Pritchard 1962:224). An ltalian hunter and trader,
Carlo Piaggia. who visited with King Tombo
from 1863 to 1865. noted that to incur fear in his
people King Tombo would take pmt in a blood
frenzy where a victim would be encircled and
murdered (Evans-Plitchard 1962:224). Further
accounts of this blUtality come from descliptions
of Bakangai, a third generation descendant of
King Tombo. Bakangai believed that "fear. not
love, makes subjects obedient and faithful" and as
a result, "he was severe and even cruel, and death
was the punishment he inflicted for the least
fault" (Evans-Pritchard 1962:224). The
IUthlessness by which the Zande kings governed
did not, however. endure as a means of control.
Evans-Pritchard. in his account Zande
kings and princcs. notes that although the
accounts of Zande brutality are well known, he
himself did not witness any such acts (Evans-
Pritchard 1962:22-+l. Not only is it the case that
"colonial power structure made the object of
anthropological study accessible and safe" (Asad
1975: 17), it also changed the very nature of
Zande justice. It is not unreasonable then, to
deduce that brutal practices were phased out with
the colonial expansion of European powers during
the early part of the twentieth century. Since
"Functional Anthropology was born after the
advent of European colonialism ... and occuned
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within the context of. .. an imperial structure of
power already established rather than one in
process" (Asad 1975:115), Zande customs of
brutality would have already been
"subordinated ... to the authority of European
administrators" (Asad 1975: 108). Therefore,
any observations of Zande practices were
tainted by European colonialism. With the
infiltration of the British into the Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan, the Azande were placed under
British military administration and the prestige
of the chiefs as lawgivers was further
diminished (Baxter 1953:23).
Subsequent to British military
occupation, the colonial administration sought
to utilize the Azande chiefs to govern the tribal
people. It was often the case that the British
Native Commissioner would require the support
of the chief to administer law over the tIibal
peoples (Gluckman 1956: 147). The tribal
leaders were not, however, permitted to govern
using customary law, but were forced to try
criminal offences under colonial law (Gluckman
1956: 148). Azande customary law stood in
direct conflict with the tenets of European law.
The colonial government would not allow the
continued practice of customary law in its raw
form and consequently brutal punishments
issued to commoners were forbidden (Reining
1966: 17). The chiefs were restricted in their
powers of adjudication and punishment, and
without murder and mutilation as deterrents, the
Zande chief began to lose his hold over his
people.
The colonial powers occupied
Zandeland, but what gave them authority over
the Azande? Evans-Pritchard, in an outline of
Zande culture, states "the Azande are so used to
authority that they are docile; that it is unusually
easy for Europeans to establish contact with
them ... [The Azande offer] little opposition to
foreign administration and [display] little scorn
for foreigners" (Evans-Pritchard 1937: 13).
However, Turner points out that colonial
anthropologists were "'apologists of
colonialism' and subtle agents of colonial
supremacy" (Asad 1975:15), so the conclusion
that the Azande would willingly submit to
colonial rule is suspect. How then, did the
colonial administration exert power over the
Azande?
According to Foucault, "law ... was the
monarchic system' s mode of manifestation and
the form of its acceptability. In Western
societies since the Middle Ages, the exercise of
power has always been formulated in terms of
law" (Hunt and Wickham 1994:43). While it may
very well be that the power of the colonial
government was vested in law, how venerable
were colonial laws among the Zande people? The
laws of colonial administration were foreign and
complex. They were grounded in years of
European history, and would not simply apply to
the customs and traditions of the Azande.
Furthermore, foreign laws must have seemed
repressive, as they favoured European interests
and morals, and did not include or relate to the
values of the Azande people.
A selies of judgements made by British
colonial officers in Aflica illustrates the partiality
of the courts to British law. In one such judgment
the court proclaimed that "the only standard of
justice and morality which a British court in
Africa can apply is its own British standard"
(Hooker 1975:133). Similarly, the French
colonial government believed that customary law
should be restIicted so that it did not exist
"contrary to the principles of French civilization"
(Hooker 1975:223).
In the case of the Belgian Congo, the
colonial administration was not entirely opposed
to customary law, declaring "indigenous chiefs
shall exercise their authority in conformity with
usage and custom, provided these are not contrary
to public order and the laws of the state.
However, the chiefs shall be placed under the
direction and control of the district
commissioners" (Reyntjens 1992:113). In effect,
the chiefs were intended to act merely as
convenient vehicles for European infiltration.
The influence of the colonial
administration on customary Zande law can be
seen in the colonial laws pertaining to theft.
Traditionally, the punishment for theft was either
mutilation or death. Following the
implementation of European law, mutilation and
death were no longer considered appropriate
punishments; restitution, or monetary
compensation was required as an alternative
(Vanderlinden 1970:346). Further evidence of
colonial involvement in customary law can be
seen in cases involving physical injuries.
Customary law dictated that the chief was to
determine the extent of a victim' s injuries and
equal suffering was to be administered to the
guilty party. Under colonial law, the chief was
still required to assess the condition of the victim,
but compensation came in the form of a monetary
settlement (Vanderlinden 1970:344). The
influence of the colonial administration served to
remove reciprocal action as a means of justice,
replacing it with a punishment that was not
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relevant to Azande society. It was a legal
sanction, the moral foundations of which must
have been beyond traditional Azande
experience and jurisprudence and, therefore.
one which the Azande could not consider
acceptable. It should be noted that consent or
acceptance always involves contestation and
conflict; acceptance, or lack thereof, would not
have been homogenous among the Azande, but
may represent popular opinion as presented by
the ethnographic literature.
According to Durkheim, "moral ideas
are the soul (l'clIne) of the law" (Cotten-ell
1999:5). It is important to recognise, however,
that morality is manifested differently between
societies. Consideration must therefore be
given to whether laws based on an uncertain
moral order conmland power and adherence.
"Durkheim sees law as the most important
expression of morality as a social fact"
(Cotten-ell 1999:56); it is an objective construct
"existing outside the individual consciousness"
(Durkheim 1938:2). Therefore, the imposition
of legal rules that oppose the popular moral
sense can only contribute to an eventual social
breakdown, and regimes which impose such
legal rules are destined to collapse (CottelTell
1999:57). In excluding Zande custom from law
the colonial administration alienated the masses,
and isolated the individual from the judicial
institution and ultimately the colonial
government itself. Ultimately, the Azande
could not possibly accept colonial laws, and the
government, in basing its rule on laws which
were founded on principles alien to the
indigenous population, undenninedjts hold on
the community and its position of power.
The colonial obsession with written
law further separated the community from its
customary laws. The colonial administration
forced the tribal leaders to compile customary
law. Case-law and precedence became the
detenninants of judgement with the resultant
loss of flexibility in the customary judicial
system (Reyntjens 1992: 119). Fmthermore, this
compilation of laws made it easier to interject
colonial law into the Azande legal system and
consequently European laws began to replace
those of custom. The rights granted to women
through European colonial law are an
illustrative example. According to Zande
custom, women could be mamed against their
will and "were frequently paid in compensation
for murder by witchcraft or for adultery"
(Evans-Pritchard 1937: 16). The law of
marriage, law of adultery, and law of
concubinage altered the rights and responsibilities
of women (Reyntjens 1992: 122), and invested
women with "privileges which they did not
previously enjoy. Azande unanimously declare
that this reform has led to serious disruption of
family life" (Evans-Pritchard 1937: 16). Although
this may not have been unanimous. European
laws meant very little to the Azande, as they did
not reflect the dynamic social framework of their
society, but instead represented laws "given to
them by the whites" (Reyntjens 1992: 119).
Inscribing for the record, cases and
verdicts normally have the effect of freezing in
time the customs of a people, but for the Azande
the effect of written law was devastating. Rather
than documenting and preserving local custom,
the written laws served to destroy oral tradition.
Bourdieu refers to the passing of information
through text as a "codification" of culture. and
Calhoun notes that the introduction of codified. or
textual means. "introduced a new institutional
dimension-the role of authOlized arbiters of
cOlTectness" (Calhoun 1995: 150). Furthermore.
Bourdieu points out an
opposition between official
knowledge ... and all kinds of
unofficial or secret, even
clandestine. knowledge and
practices which, though they are
the product of the same
generative schemes, obey a
different logic ... [T]he
transmission of 'official'
information through
authOlitative channels has in





Essentially, text has the effect of weakening the
exchange of customary knowledge and,
consequently, the ability of such customs to adapt
and change. With limitations on their capacity to
change, the customs of the Azande could not
incorporate European rules and, consequently.
the only alternative was to rely on previously
ingrained models of behaviour.
With the control over legal proceedings
in the hands of the colonial administration, the
decline in the authority of tribal chiefs set up an
interesting relationship between the chiefs and the
Azande. The Azande chiefs were in fact
descendants of a ruling caste. which took power
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over the Azande state through military
conquest. This super-plivileged caste, known
as the Avungara, took control plioI' to European
infiltration and, as previously noted, imposed
social order through brutality, tOlture and death
(Hoebel 1954:268).
The Avungara used brutality as a
means of power, with fear at the centre of their
psychological hold over the masses. Howe~er,
a distinction must be made between coercIve
power and leadership. The leadership of the
Avun<rara chiefs can be described in relation to
b .
Gramsci's concept of hegemony. GramsCl
distinguished between the state and civil
society, and defines the state as "the source of
coercive power in a society and civil society as
the site of hegemonic leadership" (Bocock
1986:28). Subsequently, Gramsci links the state
and civil society within the body of the "integral
state," which he describes as "hegemony
protected by the armour of coercion" (Bocock
1986:28). The brutality of the Avungara served
to protect their position, but their leadership was
accepted and understood. Major P. M. Larken,
a British Colonial Administrator, recorded, prior
to 1923, the myth of the founding of the
Avungara royalty by Basenginonga who "when
he had meat. . .invited everyone to come and eat
with him, which appealed greatly to the people,
and they elected him their ruler and gave him a
wife" (Evans-Pritchard 1971 :423). Other
versions include "the acceptance of
Basenginonga's authority on account of certain
qualities of personality, in particular liberality
and good judgement" (Evans-Pritchard
1971:427).
Bourdieu furthers the argument for the
acceptance of the Avungara chiefs in his
analysis of symbolic capital. "Symbolic capital
is any property (any form of capital whether
physical, economic, cultural or social) when it is
perceived by social agents endowed with
categories of perception which cause them to
know it and to recognize it, to give it value"
(Bourdieu 1998:47). The authority and cultural
leadership of the Avungara was recognised by
the masses. The chief maintained a royal court,
held feasts, received gifts of spears, and upon
entering the court "the people ... bow and greet
him with the words Bia mipe cotiro ('King, we
salute theeT (Evans-Pritchard 1971: 181-192).
The chiefs held symbolic capital, and in turn
were accepted as leaders of the Zande people.
Bourdieu's notion of symbolic capital
reveals why reverence was shown to the
Avungara chiefs, and the acceptance of the
Avungara royal house is further explained
through Gramsci' s concept of hegemony:
hegemonic leadership involves
developing intellectual, moral
and philosophical consent from
all major groups in a nation. It
involves an emotional
dimension too, in that those
political leaders who seek
hegemonic leadership must
address the sentiments of the
nation people and must not
appear as strange or alien
beings who are cut off from the
masses. (Bocock 1986:37)
This form of rule remains in sharp contrast with
colonial occupation, which made little effort to
seek acceptance from the Zande people and relied
on the comts, which, according to Gramsci, have
a "negative and repressive education function"
(Bocock 1986:29). There was little attempt to
obtain "intellectual, moral and philosophical
consent," and the supremacy of the colonial
government was based on what Gramsci referred
to as "domination," rather than hegemony, that is,
force rather than consent (Bocock 1986:86). It is
not surprising then, that the success of the
colonial administration and its legal system was
limited, leaving room for the Azande to develop a
system of justice which, while foreign to western
jmisprudence, was fair and equitable as it related
to their own moral boundaries.
In supporting the ruling Avungara caste,
the colonial administration affected what was to
be conceived of as "traditional," or "customary."
It cannot, therefore, be assumed that the Azande
as a whole would have unanimously agreed upon
the validity of customary law, or on the
legitimacy of the chiefs. As Mamdani notes,
"instead of a consensual traditional notion of
custom, the colonial era really began in the midst
of conflicting and even contrary claims about the
customary" (Mamdani 1996: 118), and "enforcing
custom became a euphemism for extending
colonial administration" (Mamdani 1996: 124).
This would have undermined the legitimacy of
Avungara rule and the authority of established
customary law.
The European invasion had imposed a
new social order on the Azande people by
restricting the brutality of the ruling caste, thereby
removing the means of coercive force. The
chiefs, therefore, no longer posed a serious threat
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to the Azande who, now free from terror, were
able to pursue magic as a means of justice.
They no longer needed to rely on a system of
legal proceedings set up by "supercilious
aristocrats of an alien, conqueling caste"
(Hoebel 1954:271) and administered under a
system of brutality, but could instead rely on a
system of justice which was viable in the
context of their own beliefs.
Previously, chiefs had been opposed to
many forms of magic. Gbudwe. for example,
found any form of magic intolerable "unless it
had been known to his father" (Evans-Plitchard
1964:221). Although Gbudwe made use of the
poison oracle on many occasions (Evans-
Plitchard 1937:290, 310), there were many
forms of magic which were unknown to the
Azande during his lifetime. They included
vengeance-magic, thunder-magic against
wrongdoers. and sorcery-magic to aid in the
pursuit of vengeance (Evans-Plitchard
1964:221).
The appearance of new forms of magic
was directly related to colonization since it had
the specific purpose of providing punishments
in lieu of those which were forbidden by the
colonial administration. Ngbasu Mani is one
such magic belonging to the closed association
of Mani (Evans-Pritchard 1937:416).
According to members of the association. this
magic only attacks wrongdoers and will have no
effect on the innocent (Evans-Pritchard
1937:417). Consequently, the magic is "never
employed in direct opposition to the law"
(Malinowski 1926:92). According to Evans-
Pritchard 0937:419). a second new magic
appeared in Zande culture subsequent to the
infiltration of colonial powers: AI1/{/f({ngi. or
medicine of the hunt, comes to the Azande from
Bongoland. Amarangi is considered good
medicine, as a man who has permission to take
something from its owner's homestead will not
be harmed (Evans-Pritchard 1937:-1-19).
Conversely, a man who steals will be struck
down. The magic of amarangi includes a ritual
where "if someone hates you and docs you ill
without cause you take a white fowl and cut its
throat in the path of the man' s homestead and
leave it there" (Evans-Pritchard 1937:-1-19).
According to Azande beliefs. if the man steps
over the fowl he will die (E\'ans-Pritchard
1937:419). Amarangi is also useful for dri\ing
away witches and sorcerers. as a sorcerer \\'ho
comes with ill intent will be plagued with "pain
in the wrists, crutch of the arms. knees and
elsewhere, and he will be forced to cra\\'1 on all
fours or stumble slowly on his feet" (Evans-
Pritchard 1937:419). These new magic tools
yielded punishments which would otherwise be
restricted by the colonial government. In as much
as the government did not validate magic in the
COUlt it could not. therefore, prosecute its use and
the Azande were then free to seek justice through
channels which, according to the Azande, showed
far more prudence than colonial and tlibal courts.
Colonialism did not provide an adequate
model for justice within Zande society and at the
same time restlicted the power of the chiefs. The
Avungara chiefs. who opposed many forms of
magic, were now powerless to stop its evolution
within the closed associations. But why did magic
in particular evolve as a viable alternative to legal
action? "Bourdieu argues that agents act within
socially constructed ranges of possibilities,
durably inscribed within them ... as well as within
the social world in which they move" (Calhoun
1995: 144). Some magic, like the poison oracle,
remains a longstanding custom, prevalent in the
daily lives of the Azande, and magic therefore
falls within their social world. Bourdieu states:
The source of historical
action .. .is not an active subject
confronting society as if that
society were an object
constituted externally. The
source resides neither in
consciousness nor in things but
in the relationship between two
stages of the sociaL that is,
between the history objectified
in things. in the form of
institutions. and the history
incarnated in bodies. in the
form of that system of endUling
dispositions which I call
habitus. (Calhoun 1995:144)
According to Bourdieu. individuals. as agents.
make use of possibilities available to them,
whether conscious or not. and "the habitus is the
source of these series of moves which are
objectively organized as strategies without being
the product of genuine strategic intention-which
would presuppose at least that they are perceived
as one strategy among other possible strategies"
(Calhoun 1995: 145). Witchcraft was part of the
Zande social world and as such, was a viable
strategy for administering justice. The traditions,
customs, myths and experiences within Zande
society contlibute to the habitus, which "makes
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possible the achievement of infinitely
diversified tasks, thanks to the analogical
transfers of schemes permitting the solution of
similarly shaped problems. and thanks to the
unceasing conections of the results obtained"
(Calhoun 1995: 149). The extensive use of
witchcraft is therefore an evolution made
possible by the habitus in the face of colonial
administration and the destruction of the
institution of Avungara rule.
Magic, as an altemati ve to legal
procedures, became prevalent when customary
law stood in opposition with the colonial courts.
This conflict manifested itself within the
institution of maniage and the concept of
divorce. Divorce was essentially unheard of in
pre-colonial Zandeland; a maniage, once
established, was considered a "pern1anent
indissoluble union between a man and a
woman" (Baxter 1953:68). With the colonial
government came a new set of laws, which were
not as restrictive on divorce and likely
contributed to the instability of the institution of
maniage in Zande society. The possibility of
divorce caused tension among the Azande.
Evans-Pritchard cites a case brought before the
COUltSwhere a divorce, as granted by the COUlt,
prompted a husband to seek vengeance magic
(amatangi or rikikpa) against the man who
committed adultery with his wife (Evans-
Pritchard 1937:420). The law, having no
protocol to punish this individual, created a
situation in which magic provided what could
be considered an acceptable alternative to legal
justice.
Magic became more prevalent after the
appearance of colonial powers in Zandeland and
it has manifested itself in the form of ritual
associations. Associations for the practice of
magic were made illegal and the Government of
the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan punished members
of such associations. As a result, associations
such as Mani, Biri, Nanda, Kpira, Siba. and
Wanga became "subtenanean and subversive"
(Evans-Pritchard 1937:511). Evans Plitchard
(1937:512) sites this trend as being indicative of
social change, a function of European rule and a
sign of the detelioration of tradition. The
appearance of the associations coincided with
the appearance of colonial government and
although this intervention brought sanctions
against associations, they continued to floUlish
as a means of judgement for those who
committed, or who intend to commit an offence
recognized by traditional Zande law (Evans-
Pritchard 1937:523).
Witchcraft has, to some extent, worked
its way into the legal system of the state. The use
of witchcraft could not be ignored and has
manifested itself within the boundaries of the
"sound mind." In a legal decision from South
Aflica the COUltconcluded the following:
A mind [which] though not
diseased so as to provide
evidence of insanity in the legal
sense, may be subject to a
delusion, or to some eIToneous
belief or some defect, in
circumstances which would
make a crime conunitted under
its influence less reprehensible
or diabolical than it would be in
the case of a mind in normal
condition ... When we find a
case like this, where there is
prof.ound belief in witchcraft,
and ... we find that this has been
the moti ve ... we feel bound to
regard the accused to be
labouring under a delusion
which ... thus provides
extenuating circumstances.
(Hooker 1975: 135)
The defence of insanity also appears within the
scope of the 1899 Sudanese Penal Code, where,
according to section 63, "nothing is an offence
which is done by a person who. at the time of
doing, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is
incapable of knowing the nature of the act..."
Although there is no record of its use plioI' to
Sudan's independence, individuals began to use
the defence of insanity for crimes resulting from
the use of witchcraft. In the case of Sudan
Government v. Fatma Hussein el Bakheit, the
accused was said to be practicing nati ve
medicine, which in turn caused the death of
another. Although the accused was convicted of
negligent homicide, the charge of culpable
homicide was dropped, as the accused claimed to
be possessed by the "Kugur" Spilit, and "was
ignorant of what she was doing" (1966). The
absence of any such cases under the colonial
administration may suggest that the Azande had
little faith in a foreign legal system, but that over
time, individuals were able to bridge the gap
between custom and law.
Industrialization and the global economy
have no doubt had an effect on the Azande. Since
the work of Evans-Plitchard, Africa has
undergone significant political and economic
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changes and it is likely that many Azande have
sought work in urban and rural settings-in
situations where there is competition for jobs
and wages. Rather than abandon uibal custom,
the Azande may have adapted their beliefs so
that witchcraft may reflect the conflict alising
from said competition. This paper establishes a
basis for understanding the influence of colonial
expansion on the efficacy of customary law
among the Azande, and leaves open for further
investigation whether recent ethnographic
material agrees with the stated conclusions. In
the absence of strong tribal authority, magic
became a means of administering justice
without the abandonment of customary
practices. Colonial rule may have removed the
customary court systems of the Avungara chiefs
and restricted the brutality of punishment, but
its intrusion did not serve to eradicate custom.
Instead, custom adapted and continued as a
strong part of Zande morality and social order.
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